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In March of 1990, an eagle-eyed auditor by the name of Paul
Biddle upset the status quo at Stanford University. As the on-campus
representative of the federal government's Office of Naval Research,
he uncovered and reported to his superiors several instances of
improper charges by Stanford.1 Since his discovery, Stanford Uni-
versity has become the subject of a criminal investigation for com-
mitting fraud against the United States, 2 the president of the university
has resigned,3 the university has returned approximately two million
dollars to the federal coffers, 4 and the university entered its 1991
fiscal year with approximately $20 million less as a result of the
Defense Contract Audit Agency's reduction of its overhead rate from
74 to 55.5 percent.5 To add insult to injury, Paul Biddle brought
suit against Stanford University seeking to use the information he
acquired in his position as contract administrator for the Office of
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1. Dennis Kelly, The Accountant Who Opened the Books on Stanford, USA
TODAY, Aug. 6, 1991, at 6D.
2. Financial Responsibility at Universities, Part 2 - Indirect Cost Recovery
Practices at U.S. Universities for Federal Research Grants and Contracts: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 118 at 105 (1991), microformed on
CIS No. 91-H369-91 (Congressional Info. Service) [hereinafter Financial Responsi-
bility at Universities, Part 2].
3. Michael McCabe, The Kennedy Years at Stanford, S. F. CHRON., Mar.
19, 1992, at A15. On July 29, 1991, President Donald Kennedy resigned effective
August 31, 1992. Id.
4. Financial Responsibility at Universities, Part 2, supra note 2, at 23-24.
5. See Financial Responsibility at Universities, Part 2, supra note 2, at 54,
62.
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Naval Research as the basis for maintaining a qui tam6 action under
the False Claims Act (Act). 7 If he is successful, he stands to reap a
profit numbering in the tens of millions of dollars." Needless to say,
Stanford is not amused. Moreover, the government, represented by
the United States Department of Justice, has sided with Stanford
University in contending that Biddle does not have standing to sue
under the Act because he acquired the information that forms the
basis of his cause of action during the course of his employment. 9
Biddle, who describes himself as contentious and a very principled
person, 0 considers himself a pebble in the shoe1' and stated that,
"We [the government] need more starch in the shorts; we need more
pebbles in shoes like Paul Biddle. If we get more of these, then there
will be change."12
This Article addresses the issue of whether federal government
employees should be able to use the False Claims Act, also known
as the "federal whistleblower statute," to personally benefit from
uncovering fraud against the government during the course of their
employment. The Article addresses, therefore, the apparent collision
between two policies: on the one hand, the federal government has
a compelling interest in vigorously pursuing those contractors who
defraud it; on the other hand, the government has an interest in not
encouraging its own investigators to enrich themselves by bringing
personal suits for damages against the target of their investigations.
The False Claims Act was signed into law in 1863' 3 by President
Abraham Lincoln as a response to cases of contractor fraud perpe-
trated on the Union Army during the Civil War.' 4 This Act has
become the federal government's primary tool for combatting fraud
perpetrated against it.' 5 The current Act permits the United States to
6. "Qui tam" is an abbreviation for the Latin phrase, "qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur," which translates as he "[wiho sues
on behalf of the King as well as for himself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th
ed. 1991). By statute, a qui tam action permits an individual to become a "private
attorney general" with a right to share in the recovery with the Government. See
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1988).
7. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1988).
8. See Howard Mintz, Feds Lobby for Limits on Whistleblower Statute,
THE RECORDER, Jan. 10, 1992, at 1.
9. See id.
10. Kenneth Cooper, Navy to Honor Biddle's Campus Crusade; Civilian
Accountant Unearthed Research Billing Excesses at Stanford, WASH. POST, Sept.
30, 1991, at A9.
11. Richard C. Paddock, Whistle-Blower Still Shaking Up Stanford, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1992, at A3.
12. Kelly, supra note 1, at 6D.
13. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, sec. 3, 12 Stat. 698.
14. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269.
15. See generally, Richard J. Oparil, The Coming Impact of the Amended
[Vol. 60
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recover treble damages plus an amount ranging from $5,000 to
$10,000 for each fraudulent or false claim.' 6 Although the government
has always been able to pursue common law contract remedies, the
government has not been very successful in detecting fraud.' 7 Con-
sequently, the False Claims Act gives an incentive to private indivi-
duals who have either a direct or independent knowledge of fraud
being committed by contractors against the government to come
forward or "blow the whistle." These whistleblowers or "relators"
can bring a qui tam action and are able to recover at least fifteen
percent but not more than thirty percent of the proceeds recovered
by the government. 8
Paul Biddle's case graphically raises the issue of whether govern-
ment employees should have standing as relators and be allowed to
initiate a qui tam action when they uncover fraud against the gov-
ernment as part of their job responsibilities. Prior to its amendment
in 1986, the False Claims Act prohibited both current and former
government employees from initiating qui tam actions based on
information acquired while a government employee. 19 Section
3730(b)(4) of the former Act provided that courts had no jurisdiction
over qui tam actions "based on evidence or information the govern-
ment had when the action was brought. ' 20 This effectively precluded
government employees from bringing the action since the government
False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L. REV. 525 (1989); Alexander M. Waldrop, Note,
The False Claims Act and the Proposed Fraud Civil Remedies Act: Complementary
Partners in the Prevention of Federal Program Fraud, 73 Ky. L.J. 967 (1984)
(discussing the False Claims Act).
16. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
17. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 14, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5268 (citing GAO Report to Congress, Fraud in Government Programs: How
Extensive is it? How Can it be Controlled? (1981)). The Senate stated that "most
fraud goes undetected due to the failure of Governmental agencies to effectively
ensure accountability on the part of program recipients and Government contrac-
tors." Id.
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
19. See United States ex rel. McCans v. Armour & Co., 146 F. Supp. 546
(D.C. Cir. 1956) (per curiam), aff'd, 254 F.2d 90, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 834 (1958).
20. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982). The Act provided, in pertinent part:
Unless the government proceeds with the action, the court shall dismiss an
action brought by the person on discovering the action is based on evidence
or information the government had when the action was brought.
Id. The prior version of this particular section stated that:
[t]he court shall have no jurisdiction to proceed with any such suit brought
under clause (B) of this section or pending suit brought under this section
whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence
or information in the possession of the United States, or any agency,
officer or employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought.
31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976). Sections 231-35 were recodified in 1982 and reenacted
without substantial changes in 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731. See H.R. REP. No. 651,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1895-96.
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had the information by virtue of the government employee uncovering
the fraud. The 1986 amendment deleted this clause leading some
courts to hold that government employees are no longer precluded
from maintaining a qui tam action. 2' These courts reached this
conclusion as a result of the statute's omission rather than an
affirmative statement of change in the statute. Under these circum-
stances, the courts' conclusion that government employees were not
barred from instituting and maintaining qui tam actions was predi-
cated on the underlying assumption that the omission of any reference
to government employees as an excluded group was a deliberate one.
Nevertheless, the Department of Justice has refused to make this
assumption. Instead, it came to the opposite conclusion, namely, that
the absence of any reference to government employees as an excluded
group was unintentional on the part of the statute draftsmen.22 As
a consequence of being at odds with the courts, the Department of
Justice is currently urging Congress to amend the statute to specifi-
cally exclude government employees from benefitting under the stat-
ute.2
3
This present controversy, therefore, is one of casus omissus. 24 In
particular, the question is whether such omission should be viewed
as intentional, thus allowing government employees to maintain the
action or whether such omission should be disposed of according to
the law as it existed prior to the Act's amendment.
II. BACKGROUND To THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY
A. The False Claims Act
In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln signed into law the False
Claims Act, 2 then also known as the "Lincoln Law," to encourage
the private citizenry to assist in ferreting out unscrupulous defense
contractors who committed fraud against the Union army by deliv-
21. See United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929
F.2d 1416, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991); United States ex rel. Givler v. Smith, 760 F. Supp.
72, 74 (E.D. Pa. 1991); United States ex rel. McDowell v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1038, 1039-40 (M.D. Ga. 1991); United States v. CAC-Ramsay,
Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D. Fla. 1990). But see United States ex reL LeBlanc v.
Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that although there was no
absolute bar to government employees bringing qui tam actions, a government
employee whose job involved detecting fraud could not use this work product to
initiate such an action).
22. Mintz, supra note 8, at 1. In November of 1991, Assistant Attorney
General W. Lee Rawls wrote Congress, "We do not believe that in liberalizing
private qui tam suits in 1986, Congress intended to give government employees this
type of windfall for performing their government jobs." Id.
23. See H.R. 4563, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 2785, 102nd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1992). The House and Senate are currently considering revisions to the False
Claims Act that would address the rights of the government employee. See id.
24. Casus omissus is defined as "[a] case omitted; an event or contingency
for which no provision is made." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 219 (6th ed. 1991).
25. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, sec. 3, 12 Stat. 698.
[Vol. 60
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ering bullets loaded with sawdust. 26 The original Act assessed both
civil and criminal penalties against a person who was found to
knowingly have submitted a false claim to the government. 27 The
civil penalty required the person committing the fraud to pay double
the amount of damages suffered by the United States as a conse-
quence of the false claim and an additional $2,000 forfeiture for
each false claim submitted. 28 The criminal penalty provided that the
person could be fined not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000 or
imprisoned for not less than one nor more than five years. 29 The
private relator or whistleblower who initiated the qui tam action was
entitled to fifty percent of the damages and forfeitures recovered and
collected by the government plus an award for litigation costs, if
successful. Once the action was underway, no one, not even the
government, could join in or take over the case.3 0 In fact, the legal
system considered the relator's interest a property right which could
not be divested by the United States."
In 1943, the Act was amended to reduce the involvement of the
private citizenry. This amendment, made at the behest of the De-
partment of Justice, was in response to a wave of parasitic suits
beginning in the 1930s and culminating in 1943 with the United States
26. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 952, 955 (1863).
27. See REv. STAT. § 3490 (1874); REV. STAT. § 5438 (1874).
28. REV. STAT. § 3490 (1874). Section 3490 provided in pertinent part:
Any person . . . who shall do or commit any of the acts prohibited by any
of the provisions of section fifty-four hundred and thirty-eight, Title
"C~ s, " shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two
thousand dollars, and, in addition, double the amount of damages which
the United States may have sustained. ...
Id.
29. REV. STAT. § 5438 (1874). Section 5438 provided in pertinent part:
Every person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to
be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in
the civil, military, or naval service of the United States . . . knowing such
claim to be false . .. or who . . . causes to be made ... any false bill
. . . or who enters into agreement . . . to defraud the Government . . . or
who, having charge ... of any money ... conceal[s] such money ...
shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than one nor more than five
years, or fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five
thousand dollars.
Id. The current criminal False Claims Act provides that:
[wlhoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military
or naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency
thereof, any claim upon or against the United States, or any department
or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982). This Article addresses only the civil statute.
30. See United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 714 F.
Supp. 1084 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
31. United States v. Griswold, 30 F. 762, 763 (C.C.D.Or. 1887).
19931
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Supreme Court decision of United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess.
3 2
In these parasitic suits, the relators brought qui tam actions based
upon information copied from government files and indictments.
33
In Marcus v. Hess, the United States contended that a relator who
based his qui tam action on information in a government indictment
should be precluded from recovering under the False Claims Act
because he did not contribute anything to the discovery of the alleged
fraud. In holding for the relator, Justice Black, speaking for the
majority of the Court, stated that neither the language of the statute
nor its history could support the government's contention that the
application of the statute was limited to those who provided new
information of fraud. There was "no reason why Congress could
not, if it had chosen to do so, have provided specifically for the
amount of new information which the informer must produce to be
entitled to reward." 3 4 In response to the government's contention
that conditions had changed since the Act was passed in 1863, 35
Justice Black retorted that, although conditions may have changed,
the statute had not been altered, and consequently, the government
selected the wrong forum in which to air its grievances.
3 6
In response to the Marcus v. Hess decision, then Attorney General
Francis Biddle urged Congress to repeal the qui tam provisions of
the Act.3 7 In a letter to Senator Frederick Van Nuys, Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee,38 the Attorney General wrote:
The result of [the Hess] decision is that whenever a grand jury
returns an indictment charging fraud against the Government there
may be a scramble among would-be informers to see who can be
the first to file civil suit based on charges in the indictment. There
are now pending 19 such suits. In 18 of these suits the basic
allegations of the informers' pleadings were copied from the in-
32. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). "[In September] 1943, there were approximately
twenty-five informer suits pending, constituting a total demand of almost
$150,000,000-a potential recovery of $75,000,000 to the informers. According to
the Attorney General, almost all of these suits were of the 'parasitic' type." (Footnote
omitted). United States ex rel. Weiss v. Schwartz, 546 F. Supp. 422, 425 (N.D. Cal.
1982).
33. See 89 CONG. REc. 10,846 (1943).
34. 317 U.S. at 546, n.9.
35. See id. at 547. In his dissent, Justice Jackson stated that:
the Senator [urging enactment of the statute] was then speaking of law -°
enforcement in a nation which had not yet established a Federal Department
of Justice, which did not then have a Federal Bureau of Investigation, or
a Treasury investigating force, and in which the activities of the Federal
Government were so circumscribed that they had not been found necessary.
Id. at 560.
36. Id. at 547.
37. See Letter from Attorney General Biddle to Senator Van Nuys (Mar. 22,
1943), reprinted in 89 CONG. REc. 7,571 (1943) (citations omitted).
38. Id.
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dictments.
To offset this condition the Department of Justice has under-
taken to file civil actions at the same time that indictments are
returned. But this has been found impractical. The exact time an
indictment will be returned can rarely be anticipated. Moreover,
this make-shift practice does not give adequate time in which to
prepare proper pleadings.
I believe that Congress should by legislation put a stop to this
unseemly and undignified scramble. The Government should have
sufficient time in which carefully to consider the advisability of
bringing such suits and the nature and contents of the pleading to
be filed, instead of being forced to proceed in the hasty manner
which alone is now available. 9
In response, the House of Representatives passed repeal legisla-
tion, but the Senate amended the House bill to retain qui tam actions,
but with restrictions ° Specifically, the Senate provided that the
courts' jurisdiction would be barred on qui tam suits based on
information already in the government's possession unless the relator
was the original source of that information. Without explanation,
the resulting conference report deleted the clause regarding original
sources.41 Subsequent court decisions strictly interpreted this jurisdic-
tional bar to prohibit any private suit based on information already
known to the government regardless of the source. 42 The 1943 amend-
ment therefore purged the courts not only of parasitic suits but also
of suits by "honest" informers who provided new information to
the government. 4 1 For example, in United States ex rel. Wisconsin v.
Dean," the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
found that the State of Wisconsin was not a proper qui tam relator
in a Medicaid fraud action because the government was already in
39. Id. There is evidence that the number of parasitic suits increased dra-
matically after the decision of United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537
(1943). As Representative Clarence Hancock pointed out, "that since the decision
.. .was rendered informer suits have multiplied very rapidly and are continuing to
multiply." 89 CONG. REc. 10,847 (1943).
40. See S. REP. No. 345, supra note 14, at 11, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5276.
41. The Conference Report stated that jurisdiction would be denied to the
court to proceed with a qui tam action "whenever it shall be made to appear that
such suit was based upon evidence or information in the possession of the United
States, or any agency, officer or employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought.
89 CONG. REc. 10,845 (1943).
42. See e.g., United States v. Pittman, 151 F.2d 851, 853 (5th Cir. 1946).
43. See Erickson v. American Institute of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp.
908, 916 (E.D. Va. 1989). This purging effect, plus the reduction of the relator's
award from fifty percent to ten percent if the government chose to intervene and
to 25 percent if the government declined to intervene, resulted in the initation of
fewer qui tam actions. See id.
44. 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
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possession of the information (albeit as a result of the State's required
disclosure under federal law regarding Medicare programs) at the
time the action was brought. 45 Despite the filing of a brief by the
federal government indicating its belief that the State of Wisconsin
was a proper relator, the Seventh Circuit noted that "[i]f the State
of Wisconsin desires a special exemption to the False Claims Act
because of its requirement to report Medicaid fraud to the federal
government, then it should ask Congress to provide the exemption."
' '
In reaction to this decision, the National Association of Attorneys
General adopted a resolution in June of 1984 to urge Congress to
amend the False Claims Act: "to prohibit sovereign states from
becoming qui tam plaintiffs because the U.S. Government was in
possession of information provided to it by the State and declines
to intercede in the State's lawsuit, unnecessarily inhibits the detection
and prosecution of fraud on the Government." 47
As a consequence of the plight of the State of Wisconsin and
other "honest" informers, Congress subsequently amended the Act.
The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 was signed into law on
October 27, 1986. The 1986 amendments liberalized the False Claims
Act in an attempt to "enhance the Government's ability to recover
losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government. ' 49 The
Act now requires a defendant found liable under the Act to pay
treble damages and a forfeiture of not less than $5,000 and not more
than $10,000 for each false or fraudulent claim. 0 The 1986 amend-
ments also make it easier for private individuals to sue on behalf of
the government. The 1986 amendments do not bar a relator from
initiating a suit based on information already in the possession of
the government. Instead, the amendments bar the relator from ini-
tiating a qui tam action only if it is based on information already
disclosed publicly in a criminal, civil, administrative, or congressional
hearing or in news media reports." Notwithstanding this bar, an
45. Id. at 1103.
46. Id. at 1106.
47. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 14, at 13 (quoting the National Association
of Attorneys General).
48. Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§
3729-33 (1988)).
49. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 14, at 1. The 1986 amendment has caused
a resurgence of private attorneys general. Although the Department of Justice has
intervened in approximately 25 percent of the qui tam actions since 1986, the
government has recovered $260 million in fiscal 1990, up from $83 million in fiscal
1987. W. John Moore, Windfalls for Whistle-Blowers, 17 NAT'L J. 48, 48 (1992).
50. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988). Liability is limited to not less than double
damages and not less than a penalty of $5,000 for those defendants who made
disclosure of their wrongdoing to investigating authorities prior to the commencement
of the action. Id.
51. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988).
[Vol. 60
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individual who is the original source 2 of the information remains a
proper relator. The relator's share of the proceeds when the govern-
ment intervenes was increased under the 1986 amendments from ten
percent to not less than fifteen percent and not more than twenty-
five percent.53 If the government does not intervene, the amendments
permit the relator to recover not less than twenty-five percent and
no more than thirty percent. 54 The former version of the Act gave a
maximum award of only twenty-five percent in this case. Regardless
of whether the government intervenes, the successful qui tam plaintiff
has a right to reasonable attorney fees, expenses, and costs.55
B. Blowing the Whistle on Stanford University
In March of 1991, Paul Biddle, the Office of Naval Research's
5 6
resident representative at Stanford University, testified before the
House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and In-
vestigations regarding abuses by Stanford that he discovered while a
Navy auditor.5 7 He had alleged that Stanford had overcharged the
federal government in excess of $200 million for research in the
1980s58 and for projects that had nothing to do with government
52. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). "[A]n individual with direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and [who] has
voluntarily provided this information to the government before filing an action. . .
Id.
53. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (1988). In certain situations where the essential
elements of the case were not provided by the relator, the relator may receive not
more than 10 percent. See also United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc. 744 F. Supp.
1158, 1161 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
54. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1988).
55. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1988); see also 31 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988).
56. The Office of Naval Research is one of the primary auditing arms of the
federal government regarding research projects. It currently monitors federal research
financing at 39 universities and colleges. Financial Responsibility at Universities -
Part 2, supra note 2, at 12. One commentator reports:
The Office of Naval Research monitors federal research contracts at
many universities as a result of a [sic] historical accident. After World War
II, the Navy was the first government agency to pay for basic university
research, and the Navy expanded its role to monitor all government
contracts, in addition to Navy research, because it had the expertise to do
SO.
Louis Freedberg, An Auditor in Stanford Scandal Rejects Transfer and Resigns, S.
F. CHRON., Nov. 22, 1991, at A2 [hereinafter Freedberg].
57. Financial Responsibility at Universities-Indirect Cost Recovery Practices
at U.S. Universities for Federal Research Grants and Contracts: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 33, at 100 (1991) [hereinafter Financial Respon-
sibility at Universities].
58. U.S. Investigates Stanford on New Overbilling Charges, L.A. TwEs, Nov.
16, 1991, at A17.
1993]
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sponsored research. For example, the General Accounting Office
confirmed several instances of improper charges at Stanford, includ-
ing an orientation for freshman students that included a trip to the
beach, $185,000 for operation of a shopping center on Stanford
property,5 9 $184,000 for depreciation on a 72-foot Jacuzzi-equipped
yacht, $4,000 for the president's wedding reception in 1987, $2,000
a month in floral arrangements, $400 for flowers for the dedication
of the Stanford horse stables and ornate furnishings for the presi-
dent's residence including the cost of enlarging the president's bed,
$7,000 for table linens and bed sheets for the enlarged bed, $1,200
for an early nineteenth century Italian fruitwood commode, $1,500
each for two Voltaire chairs from Pierre Deux, $1,284 for a pair of
George II lead urns, $2,500 to refurbish a grand piano, $10,000 for
a set of silverware, and $3,000 for a cedar-lined closet.6 The gov-
ernment also footed the bill for a reception to introduce President
Donald Kennedy's new wife to the campus. 6' During the Subcom-
mittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing, Chairman John Din-
gell, Democratic representative from Michigan, questioned the level
of involvement by the Stanford Board of Trustees in this scandal:
"We would ask where they were during these events? Well, it turns
out that they were enjoying the sufferings and tribulations of a
retreat at Stanford Sierra Camp at Lake Tahoe, which cost $45,250
and was again subsidized by the taxpayers of the United States." ' 62
Stanford has denied any deliberate attempt to overcharge and
has repaid the United States about $2 million in improper charges. 63
Although conceding that the charges were not necessarily appropriate,
Stanford continues to maintain that they were legal. Stanford was
able to bill the government for these nonresearch costs because the
university's accounting system did not separate allowable from un-
allowable costs in determining research overhead.6 Prior to the
scandal, Stanford had one of the highest reimbursement rates for
overhead costs-seventy-four percent. 65 For every $100 received from
59. See Financial Responsibility at Universities, supra note 57, at 34.
60. Id. at 3-4.
61. Maria Shao, The Cracks in Stanford's Ivory Tower, Bus. WK., Mar. 11,
1991, at 64.
62. Financial Responsibility at Universities, supra note 57, at 4.
63. U.S. Investigates Stanford on New Overbilling Charges, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
16, 1991, at A17.
64. Stanford officials "described the current accounting system as a conveyor
belt that dumps expenditures-allowed or not-into overhead accounts unless em-
ployees take special steps to remove them." Kenneth J. Cooper, Stanford to Change
Grant Accounting, WASH. POST, Jul. 23, 1991, at A19.
65. Financial Responsibility at Universities, Part 2, supra note 2, at 62.
Stanford, which normally conducts about $200 million worth of research annually,
had its reimbursement rate cut to 55.5 percent at a cost of approximately $20 million
to the institution. See also U.S. Investigates Stanford on New Overbilling Charges,
L.A. TimEs, Nov. 16, 1991 at A17.
[Vol. 60
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the government by Stanford researchers, the university got $74 more
for overhead. 66 This reimbursement rate, negotiated on a case-by-
case basis between each university and the federal auditors, is set to
cover costs of indirect research. Although it had not been auditied
for ten years, 67 Stanford contended that none of the questionable
costs were hidden from the auditors, and the research money was
spent under rules that the auditors had certified as legal at the time.6
In fact, Stanford claimed that it requested the Navy to conduct audits
of the university's accounting system, but the Navy never responded. 69
At the heart of the scandal are 125 memoranda of understanding
70
that Stanford negotiated with the Office of Naval Research. These
memoranda of understanding, signed off by government auditors,
none of whom were accountants prior to Biddle, 71 permitted the cost
recovery of these questionable expenses. In many cases, the sign-off
was perfunctory and was seen as a paper-pushing function rather
than a cost-containment measure. 72 Paul Biddle has estimated that
these special accounting exemptions cost the taxpayers as much as
$200 million during the 1980s. 73 The Defense Contract Audit Agency,
whose audit had confirmed much of Biddle's allegations, 74 maintained
that the memoranda of understanding evidencing these special ac-
66. Financial Responsibility at Universities, supra note 57, at 20.
67. Financial Responsibility at Universities, Part 2, supra note 2, at 115.
68. Tracing Research Dollars, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1992, at A10. "There
was nothing really hidden.... It was all disclosed and put in the files, but no one
was challenging the costs that were being charged." Freedberg, supra note 56, at
A2 (quoting John Ols, who heads the GAO office investigating the scandal).
69. Id.; see also Financial Responsibility at Universities, supra note 57, at
14-15.
70. Government auditors signed these memoranda approving a one-time rule
change. See generally Financial Responsibility at Universities, supra note 57, at 23-
29. As a consequence of Stanford's aggressive grantsmanship, it has the highest
number of memoranda of understanding related to research overhead for any
university. Id. at 117.
71. Freedberg, supra note 56, at A2; see also Financial Responsibility at
Universities, supra note 57, at 134.
72. Freedberg, supra note 56, at A2. Biddle stated that these prior auditors
were "misdirected, mismanaged and ill prepared to handle a contract administration
role." Id. See also, Financial Responsibility at Universities, supra note 57, at 134.
73. See Financial Responsibility at Universities, supra note 57, at 155. Ac-
counting for indirect costs is governed by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular A-21, which permits colleges to be exempted from standard pro-
cedures. These exemptions had to be approved by the federal agency with overall
responsibility for federal contracts at a given institution. In the case of Stanford,
the Office of Naval Research was that federal agency. Financial Responsibility at
Universities, Part 2, supra note 2, at 12.
74. See Financial Responsibility at Universities, supra note 57, at 117. The
audits of the Defense Contract Audit Agency are advisory to the Office of Naval
Research, which governs university Federal research funds. Larry Gordon, $230
Million in Stanford Charges Detailed in Audit, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1992, at A3.
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counting exemptions were invalid. 75 Conversely, Stanford contended
that they were valid contracts that could not be unilaterally revoked.
7 6
President Kennedy and Board of Trustees President James Gaither
have intimated that Stanford would sue if the government attempted
to revise the memoranda of understanding retroactively.
77
In the middle of this melee stands Paul Biddle. A certified public
accountant with a Masters in International Management from The
American Graduate School of International Management in Glendale,
Arizona, 78 he stands to personally profit by up to $30 million. In
September 1991, Paul Biddle filed suit against Stanford under the
False Claims Act. Stanford has retorted that not only should Biddle
not be able to recover any monies for his trouble of uncovering the
fraud as a federal employee, but also that Biddle should not be able
to continue his auditing function at Stanford now that he has filed
suit. At the prompting of Stanford officials,7 9 Representative Don
Edwards of California and Senator Jeff Bingamon of New Mexico
(both Stanford alumni) wrote letters to the Bush Administration
charging that Biddle was violating conflict-of-interest laws by contin-
uing to monitor the university while pursuing a potentially lucrative
qui tam action against the university. 80 Biddle, who was considering
leaving his Stanford post in January of 1992 to run for political
office, subsequently decided to stay and indicated that he "had
planned to leave, but it [was] obvious that Stanford [was] just as
manipulative, devious and as hell-bent to serve its interests apart
75. Financial Responsibility at Universities, Part 2, supra note 2, at 73-86.
76. See Financial Responsibility at Universities, supra note 57, at 162; Fi-
nancial Responsibility at Universities, Part 2, supra note 2, at 61. "'The heart of
Stanford's dispute (with the government) is not yachts and flowers,' said Peter Van
Etten, the university's chief financial officer, pointing out that Stanford had vol-
untarily withdrawn those costs several months ago. 'Rather, the dispute is about
the fair, actual costs of supporting research and the government's contractual
agreements to pay for those costs."' Louis Freedberg, Report Says Stanford Over-
billed Agency Seems to Confirm Whistle-Blower's Charges, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 3,
1992, at A1S.
77. Valerie Richardson, Stanford "Scandal" a 9-Digit Liability, WASH. TnMEs,
Jan. 3, 1992, at A3; see also, Financial Responsibility at Universities, Part 2, note
2, at 61, 86.
78. Louis Freedberg, Stanford Whistle-Blower Makes Parting Shots, S. F.
CHRON., Mar. 4, 1992, at Al.
79. Larry Horton, the Stanford official who contacted Edwards and Binga-
mon, stated that "[njo man or woman who is an active litigant can be considered
impartial and make decisions that can have a material impact on a case." Louis
Freedberg, Congressmen Seek Transfer of Auditor in Stanford Probe; Whistle-
Blower Accused of Having Conflict, S. F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 1991, at A27 [hereinafter
Cong. Transfer].
80. U.S. Urged to Shift Stanford Auditor, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 1991, at
A24.
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from those of the public as it was two years ago and 12 years ago."'"
However, Biddle did resign from his Navy post on February 29,
1992, in order to run for the House of Representatives as a replace-
ment for Republican Tom Campbell who relinquished his seat in
order to run for the United States Senate.
82
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Paul Biddle is not the first government employee who, by bringing
a private enforcement action against an alleged wrongdoer, has raised
the issue of whether government employees can be proper relators in
a qui tam action where the fraud alleged was uncovered during the
course of their employment. Since the Act's amendment in 1986, a
number of courts have dealt squarely with this issue. 83 The courts
are in agreement that the Act as presently written does not present
81. Cong. Transfer, supra note 79, at A27. Interestingly, this was not the
first time Stanford and Biddle have had confrontations. Biddle became the Navy
representative to Stanford University in 1988 after being rejected by Stanford for
accounting jobs. University personnel, who had long sought Biddle's ouster from
his position as contract negotiator for the Navy, viewed Biddle as disorganized,
vulgar, and egotistical. In 1990, he was placed on probation for two months after
Stanford complained to the Navy about his work. Richard C. Paddock, Whistle-
blower Still Shaking Up Stanford, L.A. TnMEs, Feb. 14, 1992, at A3; Bill Workman,
Stanford Watchdog to Run For Congress, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 14, 1992, at A23.
82. Workman, supra note 81, at A23. Paddock, supra note 81, at A3. As a
footnote, Biddle lost in his campaign efforts receiving only 14 percent of the votes
in the June primary. Final Election Returns, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1992, at A18.
83. United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1494 (11th
Cir. 1991) (an attorney for the United States Air Force became aware of, bidrigging
by NEC corporation seeking telecommunications contracts with the Federal Govern-
ment); United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d
1416, 1417 (9th Cir. 1991) (an assistant district counsel to the San Francisco District
of the Army Corps discovered that the cost allocations in a proposed contract with
the Sonoma County Water Agency did not comply with the terms of the Water
Supply Act and resulted in the improper reduction of the Water Agency's repayment
obligations); United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 18 (1st
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1312 (1991) (a Quality Assurance Specialist for
the Defense Contract Administrative Service observed several violations by Raytheon
employees in their handling of government contracts); United States ex rel. Givier
v. Smith, 760 F. Supp. 72, 73 (E.D. Pa.1991) (a commissioner on the board of a
housing authority alleged that contractors colluded to inflate bids for repairs and
improvements to a housing project and submitted the inflated bids to the housing
authority which used the bids to apply for and receive HUD funding); United States
ex rel. McDowell v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (M.D. Ga.
1991) (an Air Force employee alleged improper billings for spare parts for the F-15
fighter); United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1158 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (an investigator in the Office of Inspector General obtained access to an audit
report indicating Medicare fraud on the part of a health maintenance organization).
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an absolute jurisdictional bar to government employees as relators. 84
Akin to Justice Black's remarks in United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess,8 5 the courts are in unison that the proper forum for the
government's grievance regarding the standing of government em-
ployees as relators is Congress.8 6 More importantly, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States ex rel.
Williams v. NEC Corp., correctly perceived that the government's
grievance spoke to administrative difficulties in implementing the Act
rather than substantive contentions of violations of the Act by
government relators.87 In presenting its grievance regarding the pro-
priety of allowing former or current government employees to sue
as relators under the Act, the United States set out three contentions:
first, it contended that the public disclosure provision88 of the Act
was violated when individuals used information they compiled as
government employees in their private capacities as citizens in a qui
tam action. Characterizing such relators as occupying a dual status,
the government claimed that as long as employees used the infor-
mation in their official capacity, no public disclosure occurred.
However, when employees used this information as private citizens,
they expropriated the government's workproduct and therefore dis-
closed it to members of the public, albeit via self-disclosure. 89 The
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found
this argument to be persuasive in United States ex rel. LeBlanc v.
Raytheon.90
Moreover, the court was persuaded by the government's second
contention that government employees could not qualify under the
original-source exception under the Act 9' because they do not provide
84. However, the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts found the Justice Department's argument that policy reasons as well as
legislative intent precluded all government employees from suing as relators to be
persuasive. United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 729 F. Supp. 170, 177
(D. Mass. 1990), aff'd in result, 913 F.2d 17 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1312
(1991).
85. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g. United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d at 1504.
87. Id.
88. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) provides,
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil,
or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government
Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the
news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the
person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
31 U.S.C. § 3130(e)(4)(A) (1988).
89. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp. 931 F.2d at 1499;
United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon, 913 F.2d at 20.
90. 729 F. Supp. 170 (D. Mass. 1992).
91. Section 3730(e)(4)(B) provides,
For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individual
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information voluntarily. Instead, they provide information to the
government as a requirement of their employment.
92
Although affirming the district court's holding in LeBlanc, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit discredited the
"dual status" theory because the theory assumed that government
employees "lead schizophrenic lives and can publicly disclose infor-
mation to themselves. ' 93 The court went on further to say that a
court's jurisdictional power over a qui tam action is not divested
merely because the information was made available to the public.
Rather, section 3730(e)(4)(A) only prohibits courts from hearing qui
tam actions based on information made available to the public during
the course of a government hearing, investigation, or audit or from
the news media.9 Therefore, the First Circuit held that government
employees were allowed to initiate qui tam actions based upon
information acquired during the course of their employment so long
as it was not acquired from a government hearing, investigation, or
audit or through the news media. 9
Nevertheless, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
and dismissed the qui tam action because LeBlanc did not qualify
for the original-source exception to section 3730(e)(4)'s.jurisdictional
bar. The court agreed with the lower court's analysis that LeBlanc
had an affirmative duty to provide the government with the infor-
mation and, therefore, since the fruit of his efforts was the govern-
ment's workproduct, he was not an entity indistinguishable from the
government to have independent knowledge of the information form-
ing the basis of the action.96
This decision has been criticized by later courts that correctly
pointed out that the original-source exception to the jurisdictional
bar need not be invoked once a court finds that the information
upon which the qui tam action was based was not publicly disclosed
as delineated in section 3730(e)(4)(A). In other words, once relators
successfully overcome the public disclosure jurisdictional bar, qui
tam plaintiffs need not prove that they were an original source of
the information .
97
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which
the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before filing an action under this section which is based
on the information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1988).
92. 729 F. Supp. at 176.
93. 913 F.2d at 20.
94. This prohibition also bans private citizens from bringing qui tam actions
if the information forming the basis of the action was acquired during the course
of a government hearing, investigation or audit or from the news media. See 31
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988).
95. 913 F.2d at 20.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g. United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d at 1500,
n. 13.
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The government's third contention was that the 1986 amendment
did not repeal the comprehensive bar against qui tam suits by
government employees as found in the 1943 version of the False
Claims Act. 9 Instead, the United States argued that the failure of
the 1986 amendment to explicitly include government employees as
proper relators was an indication that Congress had no intention of
changing the law as it applied to them.Y
As a consequence of Congress' failure to state explicitly its
intentions with regard to government employees, the courts have had
to invoke various rules of statutory construction in order to determine
the merits of the government's position. In general, courts are reticent
to infer congressional intent where the language of the statute appears
clear and plain on its face:
"Where the language of a statute is a clear expression of congres-
sional intent [a court] need not resort to legislative history." The
search for legislative intent begins and ends with the language of a
statute unless: (a) the language of the statute is ambiguous; (b)
legislative history shows that Congress clearly expressed an intent
contrary to the plain language of the statute; or (c) the apparent
clarity of language leads to an absurd result when applied.1°°
The comprehensive bar provision in Section 3730(b)(4) of the
1943 version of the Act was replaced by Section 3730(e), which, in
addition to barring suits based on public disclosure in certain pro-
ceedings, listed three other types of suits which would invoke the
jurisdictional bar: (1) suits between members of the military; (2) suits
against members of Congress, the judiciary, or senior executive
officials if the action was based on evidence or information known
to the government when the action was brought; and (3) suits based
on allegations that were the subject of a civil suit in which the United
States was already a party. I0' As one court observed, Congress had
98. Id. at 1501.
99. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
100. United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons v. Blue Cross, 755 F. Supp. 1040,
1047 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (citations omitted).
101. In pertinent part, the Act provides:
(e) Certain Actions Barred. (1) No court shall have jurisdiction over
an action brought by a former or present member of the armed forces
under subsection (b) of this section against a member of the armed forces
arising out of such person's service in the armed forces.
(2)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under
subsection (b) against a Member of Congress, a member of the judiciary,
or a senior executive branch official if the action is based on evidence or
information known to the Government when the action was brought.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "senior executive branch official"
means any officer or employee listed in section 210(f) of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.).
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a choice in how it structured the statute: it could have chosen to
make eligible as qui tam relators only certain defined groups of
persons and exclude all others, or it could have chosen to include
all persons as eligible qui tam relators with specific exceptions.1
0 2
Because Congress chose the latter scheme, courts have reasonably
inferred that government employees are included in the general
universe of eligible qui tam relators unless they fall into one of the
four specifically excluded groups noted above. 103 Moreover, this
inference is consistent with the rule of statutory construction that
the enumeration of specific exclusions from the operation of a statute
is an indication that the statute should apply to all cases not specif-
ically enumerated. 104
In response to the Department of Justice's contention that Con-
gress did not realize that by changing the statutory language it might
allow qui tam suits by government employees, 05 the courts noted
that there was no extraordinary showing of contrary intention that
would justify an alteration of the plain meaning of the statutory
language.'06 To infer such contrary intent would be to violate the
rule of statutory construction that states Congress is assumed to act
with deliberation rather than by inadvertence. l° However, Congress
did not contemplate the issue of whether government employees
could sue as qui tam relators. In fact, one of the drafters of the
1986 amendment indicated that it was convenient not to have the
issue surface in Congress because of the complexities of "trying to
differentiate the types of situations where it may be appropriate to
allow a government employee to bring a false-claims suit and those
situations where they may be accused of simply cashing in on their
government-assigned task-which was never intended by law."' 18 The
primary concern of the drafters of the 1986 amendment was to
(3) In no event may a person bring an action under subsection (b)
which is based upon allegations or transactions which are the subject of a
civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the
Government is already a party.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (1988).
102. Erickson v. American Institute of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908,
912 (E.D. Va. 1989).
103. See id. at 913.
104. See Matter of Cash Currency Exchange, Inc., 762 F.2d 542, 552 (7th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom., 474 U.S. 904 (1985).
105. Erickson v. American institute of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. at
918, n.23.
106. See e.g., United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons v. Blue Cross, 755 F. Supp.
1040, 1048 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
107. See supra note 105.
108. Statement by John Phillips, a Los Angeles plaintiff's attorney who
specializes in False Claims Act litigation. David Lapp, Blowing the Whistle, Loudly;
What Can a Civil Servant Do About Fraud on the Government When It Won't
Listen? The Answer, the Justice Department Seems to Say, is Nothing, THE RE-
CORDER, May 2, 1991, at 4.
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overcome the restrictive effect of the 1943 amendment and enhance
the ability of persons to bring fraud to light. °9 As Justice Scalia
observed while interpreting a different statute, "Congress often acts
'only one step at a time,' to eliminate one abuse that has become
the focus of its attention but not all allied abuses . . . ." '0 Conse-
quently, it is quite plausible that the current Act as literally applied
does not correspond to what Congress would have intended if it had
considered all allied abuses. Needless to say, Congress is the proper
forum for fleshing out what Congress intended. The remainder of
this Article addresses some of the policy concerns underlying the
ability of government employees to become relators and proposes
recommendations for changes in the statute.
IV. POLICY CONCERNS
Investigators and auditors like ... Stanford-assigned Navy auditor
Paul Biddle have a conflict of interest and an unacceptable incentive
to self-deal if they are allowed to participate in substantial recoveries
simply for doing their job. Their duty to ferret out fraudulent
claims competes with their financial incentive to sue on behalf of
the government and share up to 30 percent of the recovery. We
think it's simply wrong for government's own watchdogs, whether
GAO auditors, Justice Department lawyers or FBI agents, to use
information they learned on the job for their own financial benefit
rather than allowing the government to use the information as the
basis of its own prosecution."'
There are several legitimate policy concerns that present obstacles
to the ability of government employees to sue as qui tam relators
under the False Claims Act. First, critics argue that to permit
government employees to sue under the Act using information they
acquired during the course of their jobs would be to reward them
twice for their investigative efforts." 2 Second, recovery under the Act
would encourage such employees to focus their investigative efforts
only on those jobs that have a potential of a high financial pay-
off."3 A corollary of this is that the employee may put off investi-
109. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 14, at 12.
110. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 175 (1990).
111. Senator Charles Grassley and Representative Howard Berman, Finding a
Middle Ground in Qui Tam Suits, WASH. POST, February 2, 1992, at C6.
112. "Why should Mr. Biddle, who is already being paid to audit Stanford's
books and who has been able to obtain information, question university officials
and rely on public support services only because he is working for the federal
government, be able to claim this additional bonanza?" Qui Tam Scam, WASH.
POST, Dec. 26, 1991, at A22. See also United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp,
931 F.2d 1493, 1503 (11th Cir. 1991).
113. See Erickson v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908,
916, n.18 (E.D. Va. 1989).
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gative efforts where fraud is suspected to allow the "pay-off" to get
large enough to sue under the Act:
Indeed, a blanket ruling allowing government employees to bring
qui tam suits could prove catastrophic, potentially paralyzing in-
vestigative bodies like the offices of the inspectors general and the
Justice Department. In their official capacity, investigators might
pursue cases half-heartedly, so that as private plaintiffs-entitled to
a percentage of the recovery-they might later, enrich themselves
by bringing the same cases.
'4
A second corollary is that a conflict of interest arises if a
government employee is allowed to file a qui tam action and remain
on the case to continue investigative efforts. For example, Represen-
tative Don Edwards of California and Senator Jeff Bingaman of
New Mexico wrote letters to the Bush Administration urging the
removal of Paul Biddle from his post at Stanford because he was
violating conflict of interest laws" 5 by continuing to monitor the
university while pursuing a potentially lucrative lawsuit against the
institution."16 An editor at the Washington Post stated that "[tihe
conflict of interest here is as clear as it would be if judges were
empowered to set fines and keep a percentage of everything they
collect." 7
A third concern in allowing government employees to sue under
the statute is that mistrust could be created among government
employees who may see their peers as overzealous and self-seeking
in their efforts to become relators in qui tam suits. A fourth concern
is that unscrupulous government investigators might steal fraud claims
that private parties bring to the government's attention." 8 These
particular concerns are not new. While urging fellow lawmakers to
adopt the conference report regarding the 1943 amendment to the
Act, Representative Clarence Hancock stated:
The temptation and the opportunity is tremendous under the [orig-
inal] law for renegotiators, contracting officers of the various pur-
chasing agencies of the Government, and agents for collectors of
114. Lapp, supra note 108, at 4.
115. Federal law provides that no government employee can serve in a post
in which he has a conflict of interest. As the Office of Naval Research's resident
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO), Biddle was responsible for negotiating
and establishing the indirect cost rates at Stanford. See generally Financial Respon-
sibility at Universities, Part 2, supra note 2, at 66. As indicated earlier, a central
allegation of Biddle was that the previously agreed upon indirect rates as evidenced
by the memoranda of understanding entered into by Stanford and prior ACOs were
improper.
116. Transfer of Stanford Case Auditor Urged, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991,
at A40.
117. Qui Tam Scam, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1991, at A22.
118. W. John Moore, Windfalls for Whistle-Blowers, 17 NAT'L J. 48 (1992).
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internal revenue to take advantage of the information they discover
in the course of the business to enrich themselves by instigating
informer's suits. That is a temptation we wish to remove." 9
In fact, Congress also was concerned that government employees
would try to circumvent the prohibition against their serving as
relators by providing information to their friends. 2'
Despite the legitimacy of these policy concerns, the point must
still be made that fraud against the government is pervasive. 2 ' The
government's ability to detect fraud is handicapped without the
cooperation of those who are either close observers or otherwise
involved in the fraudulent activity. 122 In this respect, government
employees may be in the best position to ascertain and expose
fraudulent activity. However, the United States Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board conducted a survey in 1983 that found sixty-nine
percent of government employees who believed they had direct knowl-
edge of illegalities failed to report the information.
2
1
Those employees who chose not to report fraud were then asked
why they failed to come forward. The most frequently cited reason
given (53 percent) was the belief that nothing would be done to
correct the activity even if reported. Fear of reprisal was the second
most cited reason (37 percent) for nonreporting.'2
The validity of these fears is found in two cases involving
government employees. In United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma, 125
James Hagood, an Army Corps of Engineers attorney, initiated a
qui tam action after he was removed from his position and transferred
to Alaska. This removal and transfer was prompted by his refusal
to approve a contract between the Corps and the Sonoma County
Water Agency in California "on the basis that it violated a variety
of federal fiscal and environmental regulations and statutes." 126 The
suspect contract was subsequently approved by his superiors. 27 In
United States ex rel Williams v. NEC Corp.,128 Arthur Williams, a
119. 89 CoNG. Rnc. 10,849 (Dec. 17, 1943).
120. "We feel that by enacting this . . . legislation . . . there will not be this
ever-present invitation ... for dishonest and unscrupulous investigators to turn over
information to their friends or co-conspirators for the purpose of bringing suit .... .
89 Co NG. Rnc. 10,846 (1943).
121. The Department of Justice has estimated fraud as draining one to ten
percent of the entire federal budget or approximately $10 to $100 billion annually.
S. REp. No. 345, supra note 14, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.N.N. 5266, 5268.
122. Id. at 5269.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 5269-70.
125. 929 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1991).
126. Herbert Hafif & Phillip E. Benson, "Qui Tam": No Scam, WASH. POST,
Jan. 28, 1992, at A21.
127. Id.
128. 931 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).
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civilian Air Force attorney, detected a bid-rigging scheme among a
consortium of Japanese contractors and reported it to his superiors:
"For his efforts, Williams was placed under investigation. In disgust,
he retired to Florida and filed a qui tam action.' 1 29 The United
States won a $34 million settlement against the Nippon Electric
Company, but Williams did not get a cent. 130
These cases are not the only examples. In the case of Paul Biddle,
Representative John Dingell remarked that "[tihe record shows he
was treated rather shamefully by Stanford and by his superiors."''
He was put on probation for more than eighteen months, received
no merit increases or bonuses, suffered "downgraded personnel re-
views and numerous other attempts by Stanford-through his super-
iors-to gag him, destroy his credibility and remove him permanently
from Stanford.' '3 2 Leon Weinstein, a Miami investigator in the
Inspector General's office of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services, initiated more than 50 qui tam actions against
health care providers, 3 3 alleging false billing and other illegal prac-
tices. 34 Prior to filing these actions, Weinstein, to no avail, had
urged Inspector General Richard Kusserow to prosecute a number of
the providers.' Weinstein retired in frustration and brought these
actions. 3 6 While challenging Weinstein's right to sue under the stat-
ute, the Department of Justice joined the actions and has already
settled three of them recovering approximately $600,000. 17 As a
consequence of challenges by the Department of Justice, no govern-
ment employees, to date, who have filed qui tam actions have received
any money for their investigative efforts.1
3
1
The government contends that the removal of the comprehensive
bar would encourage an explosion of qui tam actions by government
employees.3 9 However, as has been noted by attorneys for Paul
Biddle, "there has been no great invasion of the courts by government
employees seeking to get rich from the statute. Nor has there been
129. Hafif & Benson, supra note 126, at A21.
130. Louis Freedberg, Payoffs Challenged, Blowing a Whistle on Whistle-
Blowers, S. F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Payoffs Challenged].
131. Kelly, supra note 1, at 6D; see also Financial Responsibility at Univer-
sities, supra note 57, at 3.
132. Hafif & Brown, supra note 126, at A21.
133. See, e.g., United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp 1158 (S.D.
Fla. 1990), aff'd, 963 F.2d 384 (1lth Cir. 1992).
134. David Lapp, Justice Department Covers Ears to Blowing Whistles, CONN.




138. Payoffs Challenged, supra note 130, at Al.
139. See Howard Mintz, Qui Tam On Campus; DOJ Policy Stiffs Stanford
Whistleblower, LEGAL TimEs, Jan. 20, 1992, at 2.
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any evidence of government employees' sandbagging information
obtained during performance of their governmental duties in hopes
of filing qui tam suits before the government acts."14
In general, government employees are no different than private
sector employees who blow the whistle.' 14 As the cases' 42 and the
statistics of the Merit Systems Protection Board 143 bear out, govern-
ment employees can be subject to stone-walling, reprimanding, and
firing by superiors. For example, Pentagon whistleblower Ernie Fitz-
gerald was fired at the request of Richard Nixon after Fitzgerald
testified before Congress in 1969 about the added costs on the C-5
transport plane. It took Fitzgerald fourteen years and $1 million in
legal fees to obtain a position similar to his old job.' 4
[Wihistleblowers don't exist exclusively in the private sector. Rank-
and-file government employees who are not investigators or auditors
may . . . become whistleblowers if, because of bureaucratic corrup-
tion, malaise or politics, their superiors decline to pursue meritorious
fraud cases. In these cases, the government and taxpayers can only
benefit from the filing of a False Claims action that exposes fraud
that would otherwise have gone undiscovered or unprosecuted.
45
An additional reason for not restricting government employees
under the Act is that many allegations of fraud are currently going
unaddressed because of resource and budgetary constraints on the
part of the government. Allegations that could possibly develop into
significant cases are frequently left unaddressed because of a judg-
ment by federal auditors, investigators, and attorneys that devoting
scarce resources to a questionable case may not be efficient.1' 6 Gov-
ernment employees who assist or initiate the investigations on these
unaddressed cases should be allowed to pursue them through a private
qui tam action. It has already been established that "assistance from
the private citizenry can make a significant impact on bolstering the
government's fraud enforcement efforts."'' 47 This is a major reason
140. Hafif & Benson, supra note 126, at A21.
141. See Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory
Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 277 (1982). See also Jack Stieber & Michael
Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319 (1982).
142. See supra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. See also, Bruce D. Fong,
Whistleblower Protection and the Office of Special Counsel: The Development of
Reprisal Law in the 1980s, 40 AMER. U.L. REV. 1015 (1991).
144. Payoffs Challenged, supra note 130, at Al.
145. Grassley & Berman, supra note 111, at C6.
146. See S. REP. No. 345, supra note 14, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5272.
147. Id. at 8.
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why the qui tam provisions were revitalized in 1986.148 It has been
argued that to allow government employees to recover under the Act
would appeal to their sense of greed. 49 Even if this premise is
accepted, one need only consider the alternative if government em-
ployees are not allowed to sue-the continuation of unchecked,
rampant fraud. Indeed, personal enrichment may be the primary
motivation behind an employee's desire to bring a qui tam action;
however, the government is enriched as well by recovering up to 100
percent of misappropriated funds plus penalties. Further, those in-
volved in fraudulent schemes may be effectively deterred if they knew
that they could not rely on the ineptitude or malaise of government
employees in ferreting out illegal activity. 50 As a consequence of not
placing a jurisdictional bar against government employees' ability to
sue under the False Claims Act, all are winners-the government
recoups money it would not have otherwise, and government em-
ployees are compensated for taking risks and "going the distance"
in their investigative efforts.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The False Claims Act should be revised to clarify the eligibility
status of government employees to sue as qui tam plaintiffs. Congress
should also recognize the interests of the government in assuring that
the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act not be reduced to a
mere vehicle for early retirement by government employees. In gen-
eral, the statute should be revised to limit, if not prevent, avarice
from being the primary motivator for government employees doing
their jobs. In particular, the statute should address the situation
where government employees are either concentrating their investi-
gative efforts or impeding their own or others' investigative efforts
in order to subsequently file cases that offer the potential of a high
financial pay-off. In addition, the statute should address the em-
ployment consequences of the government employee who brings this
private enforcement action but who still has a position overseeing
the operations of the alleged wrongdoer. Accordingly, it is important
to establish procedural safeguards to assure that the potentially
conflicting interests of the government and the government employee
are both heard.
148. See Bland, Why 'Qui Tam' is Necessary, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 4, 1991, at
13.
149. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
150. The social benefits of a private enforcement suit can outweigh its private
benefits to the relator. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. Rav. 669, 672, n.6 (1986).
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When government employees become aware of illegalities com-
mitted by contractors, they should provide a written report of these
findings to their immediate supervisor. The report should include a
standard cover sheet, which would require that the superior, or a
designee, sign and date the sheet as evidence of the time of the
employee's submission. Also noted on this cover sheet would be the
date by which time the contracting agency would have to respond to
the facts alleged in the report. A period of one year to give the
contracting agency an opportunity to determine its course of action
seems reasonable in this regard. Once the employee's superior has
received the report, the superior would be required to notify the
head of the contracting agency, who would in turn consult with the
cognizant' 5' Office of Inspector General or the Attorney General if
no Office of the Inspector General exists for that agency.
5 2
If the contracting agency intends to investigate further, it should
document its intended course of action and forward a copy of this
determination to the employee.' The employee could then choose
to initiate a qui tam cause of action if the employee believes that
the investigative efforts undertaken by the contracting agency are
insufficient in deterring the illegal activity or represents an undue
compromise of the government's recovery potential in relation to the
harm caused it by the contractor's breach. 5 4 Further, if the agency,
in writing, declines to pursue the matter or simply does not respond
to the employee-submitted report within the one-year time frame,
the employee should be allowed to sue. In either case, regardless of
the agency's disposition on the employee-submitted report, the Act
should require the employee who does choose to bring the qui tam
cause of action to put in writing the reasons why the employee
believes that the contracting agency's determined course of action is
insufficient to protect the government's interest. When the govern-
ment employee initiates the qui tam action by filing a claim in court,
the filed documents should include not only the allegations forming
the basis of the cause of action, but should also include the signed
and dated cover sheet, the correspondence, if any, from the con-
151. Cognizance is determined on the basis of the contractor's location. See,
e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 442.102(b) (1992).
152. This procedure is similar to that already in place for the Department of
Health and Human Services (see, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §§ 303.104-11 (1992)), and the
Department of Agriculture (see, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §§ 403.203-.204; 48 C.F.R. §
442.102 (1992)). See also, 48 C.F.R. § 501.602-3 (1992); 48 C.F.R. § 503.303 (1992)
(regarding the General Services Administration).
153. Of course, if the agency needs an extension of time, this should also be
communicated in writing to the employee.
154. The employee should also be allowed to initiate a qui tam action if the
agency has sought an extension based on the insufficiency of resources to adequately
address the allegations in the employee-submitted report. See infra note 158. This
would prevent an agency from stonewalling the employee.
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tracting agency regarding its disposition of the employee-submitted
report, and the employee's reasons for pursuing this cause of action.
In reviewing the filed documents, the government needs to have
a procedure whereby it can determine (1) whether there is a govern-
ment interest sufficiently compelling to override the interests of the
government employee in pursuing the qui tam cause of action; and
(2) whether the cause of action is parasitic.
It is only proper in the first regard that the government have the
opportunity to challenge the government employee's right to sue if
national security or some other compelling government interest is
threatened by the bringing of the qui tam action.'55 Even so, the
provision in the current Act that requires the qui tam plaintiff's
complaint to be filed in camera and to remain under seal for at least
sixty days 5 6 should allow the government sufficient time to object
and suppress the employee's right to sue if a compelling government
interest is indeed at issue. Congress intended this sixty-day time
period to allow the government a sufficient opportunity to fully
evaluate the qui tam suit and "determine both if that suit involves
matters the government is already investigating and whether it is in
the government's interest to intervene and take over the . . . ac-
tion." '157 A court can extend this sixty-day evaluatory period if the
government so petitions and shows good cause.5 8 In addition, the
qui tam action can be dismissed if the court and the Attorney General
give written consent to the dismissal and state their reasons for
consenting.5 9 If a government interest is truly compelling, a court
155. A compelling government interest would be found to bar the cause of
action if the employee has not fully complied with the procedures as laid out above.
Moreover, in determining whether there is an overriding public interest that would
extinguish the government employee's right to sue, the Department of Justice can
take under advisement any reasons that the contracting agency indicated in its
correspondence to the employee regarding government interests that would be
threatened if the employee initiated the qui tam cause of action.
156. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1988). The current version of the Act clarifies
that the 60-day period does not begin to run until both the complaint and material
evidence are received by the Government. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 14, at 23,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5288 (emphasis in original).
157. S. REp. No. 345, supra note 14, at 24, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5288.
158. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (1988). According to the legislative history, good
cause would not be established by a mere showing that the government was
overburdened and did not have an opportunity to address the complaint. S. REp.
No. 345, supra note 14, at 25, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5290. However,
a pending criminal investigation would often establish good cause but would not be
considered an automatic bar to lifting the seal from the civil complaint. Id.
159. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1988). Currently, if the government does not
seek dismissal, but merely declines to join in the suit, the qui tam plaintiff is free
to pursue the cause of action alone and at his or her own risk and expense. 31
U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) & (4) (1988).
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would arguably consent to the government's petition for dismissal.
If the government is unable to demonstrate a compelling interest
that would suppress the government employee's right to sue, the
government should then be afforded an opportunity to discern whether
the cause of action is parasitic. In this instance, a determination
should be made as to (1) whether the employee is the original source
of the information; (2) whether the employee alerted superiors and
other appropriate personnel to the alleged illegality prior to bringing
suit; and (3) whether sufficient time was given the government to
pursue the matter. This analysis should be more perfunctory if the
completed cover sheet and other agency correspondence regarding
the matter were filed with the court. If an employee waited the
requisite one year as evidenced by the signed and dated cover sheet,
the government should find that the cause of action is not parasitic.
However, this finding is not automatic. If the employee is not the
original source of the information, the Department of Justice should
make additional inquiries to determine how the employee came upon
the information and whether the government had an appropriate
time in which to respond to the allegations before deciding whether
the suit is parasitic. 160 Moreover, a distinction should be made be-
tween those employees whose job it is to investigate fraud and other
illegalities against the government and those employees who have
non-investigative positions. The potential for abuse in the use of
their positions for personal enrichment is greatest among those whose
job it is to ferret out illegal activity. However, this is not to say that
there should be a blanket prohibition against those employees whose
job encompasses investigative functions. These individuals are the
very ones who have the greatest opportunity to detect and report
fraud and yet run the risk that superiors will not act on their claims
because of scarce resources, ineptitude, or general malaise. Instead,
these claims should be scrutinized more closely by the system for
any evidence that could point to a reasonable conclusion that such
employees have abused the privileges afforded their position in order
to personally profit.
By utilizing the above procedures, government employees would
benefit because they would submit the claim once to their superior
without any concern as to whether the appropriate personnel was
alerted to the alleged abuse. Further, if no action is taken on the
matter or no response is given the employee within a certain time by
the agency, the employee should be free to pursue the matter privately
via a qui tam action. Since the one-year time limit within which the
agency has to act or respond to the employee presents an objective
standard, the employee should not have to second-guess whether he
or she has waited long enough before pursuing the matter privately.
160. Moreover, inquiry should be made to insure that the employee is not
stealing fraud claims that private parties bring to the government's attention.
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Consequently, it would be efficient if the contracting agency consid-
ered all allegations of illegality by government employees as poten-
tially becoming the subject of a qui tam action. Therefore, during
this one-year and sixty day time frame for the agency and the
Department of Justice, respectively, these organizations should make
assessments to determine whether any compelling government interest
exists that conflicts with the employee's right to sue, and if not,
whether the claim, if the subject of a qui tam action, would be
parasitic. It would appear that one year should provide a realistic
time frame in which the agency would have time to assess the situation
and determine a course of action or inaction in the matter. In the
same vein, it appears realistic for the Department of Justice to be
able to determine its course of action or inaction in relation to its
resources within the sixty days as provided currently in the Act.
If a government employee, who is an original source of the
information, is successful in a qui tam action in which the government
declines to intervene, a recovery based on a sliding scale indicative
of the level of effort the plaintiff put into pursuing the cause of
action would be appropriate. In no event should this award exceed
ten percent. If the government does choose to intervene, recovery
should be reduced to a maximum of five percent.'16 If a government
employee is not an original source 62and the government declines to
intervene, a court should award the relator a recovery, again using
a sliding scale, indicative of the extent to which the relator's efforts
resulted in an award to the government. In no event should this
award exceed five percent. If the government chooses to intervene,
the maximum recovery should be reduced to two percent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Government employees should have standing as relators in order
to initiate a qui tam action against contractors who commit fraud
against the United States. Basing the cause of action on information
acquired as a part of the employee's job responsibility should not
preclude the employee from recovery. With its scarce resources, the
federal government is not in a position to effectively curb the
pervasive and rampant fraud committed against it. The False Claims
161. Arguably, a government employee should be required to withdraw as
relator once the government chooses to intervene. However, by allowing the employee
the option to remain as a party to the suit, the relator has the opportunity to object
to any proposed settlement amounts that are thought to be too low.
162. A question may be raised as to why the Act should allow a government
employee who is not an original source to maintain the qui tam action. Even in
this case the government is benefitted if it would not have pursued the claim in its
own right. Further, by permitting the qui tam action, it prevents the wrongdoer
from falling through the cracks and thus serves as an effective deterrent against
contractor fraud.
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Act was enacted, and subsequently strengthened, in order to assist
the government in its policing and enforcement efforts. Private
citizens, compelled by greed or the need to do what is right, have
managed to put money back into the United States Treasury.
63
Government employees, as members of the public citizenry, may be
in the best position to detect and expose fraudulent activity. Their
proximity, which allows them to closely observe illegal activity, and
their position, which allows them to audit the organization and direct
questions to various levels of personnel, provide them with a unique
opportunity for detecting fraud. Akin to the plight suffered by many
private sector employees who blow the whistle on their employers,
coming forward with information that fraud has been committed
against the government involves risk to the government employee.
Coming forward with such information can underscore ineptitude,
malaise, or corruption within the federal agency. In terms of adverse
risk scenarios, coming forward can result in reprisal against the
employee as a worst case, or in general frustration and hopelessness
as a better case. 64 In either scenario, government interests are not
furthered and are, in fact, hindered. Allowing government employees
to maintain qui tam actions would compensate them for these risks
and would provide a sense of hope and vindication that coming
forward was, indeed, worth it. Placing the burden on agencies to
take action or risk a qui tam suit will create the best incentive to
ferret out fraud.
163. Assisted by private citizens, the United States Treasury recovered $260
million in fiscal 1990, up from $83 million in fiscal 1987. Moore, supra note 49, at
48.
164. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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